PRIMA FICHE

GUIDE

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

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FOREWORD

The nearly 1500 documents in this substantial collection of primary source material are drawn from major archival holdings and provide a rich sample of a half-century of Russian-American relations. They present to students of international affairs the raw material from which historical conclusions may be drawn on the most significant rivalry between two nations of the twentieth century. As Professor Stoler explains in his introduction, tension and conflict characterized this great power relationship from the turn-of-the-century disputes with the czar to the mid-century struggles with the commissars.

Students will find these documents a fascinating source of insight into the basic historical antipathy that has continued over the years to present times. Particularly arresting is the persistence of antithetical perspectives in Moscow and Washington. Again and again American diplomats confess their inability to understand the logic of Soviet perceptions and actions. The Americans, even in the best of times, make little sense in word or deed to the Russians. The result has been the periodic eruption of clearly antagonistic policy offensives by both sides.

Even during the Great Alliance of World War II, the focus of this collection, mistrust permeated the relationship despite the personal ties that the Big Three professed for each other. Their correspondence and accounts of the great wartime conferences clearly reveal the extraordinary personalities who presided over the global struggle.

Jim Watts
General Editor

INTRODUCTION

For the last thirty-five years the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that we refer to as the Cold War has not only dominated international relations but also the domestic histories of the countries involved. It remains today, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the primary issue in both world and national politics.

According to most historians, the Cold War began in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Facing each other across a worldwide power vacuum that resulted from their victory over the Axis powers and no longer held in alliance by their fear of a common enemy, the Soviet Union and the United States quickly began to argue over the proper shape of the postwar world and to accuse each other of hostile, aggressive intentions. Within a few years these arguments and condemnations escalated to the point of open conflict. Actual world war did not occur, largely because of mutual fear of the destruction that would result from another all-out military struggle, but Soviet-American confrontation brought the two powers to the brink of war on numerous occasions and to actual fighting by means of surrogates.

Discussions on the origins of the Cold War involving only post-World War II conflicts distort the historical record, however, by ignoring the roots of the struggle in the pre-1945 era. Many of those roots can be traced to the wartime alliance itself; others date back to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. But the most fundamental causes of the Cold War lie in nineteenth-century events, and it is to these events that one must first turn in order to understand the conflict that erupted after 1945.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century relations between the United States and Russia were extremely cordial, but this cordiality neither stemmed from the peaceful nature of the two countries nor from any common ideology. To the contrary, Russia and the United States constituted two of the most aggressive and expansionist powers of the century. The ideals and politico-economic systems that helped to fuel and rationalize their expansionist drives were in many ways diametrically opposed.

In conquering the North American continent and establishing dominance throughout the Western Hemisphere, the United States found itself in a relatively isolated geographical position, confronted by few major military powers, and was therefore able to develop and maintain a relatively decentralized politico-economic system emphasizing individual freedom, political democracy, and a capitalist economic structure in order to underwrite and justify its expansion. Russia, on the other hand, found herself in a very different situation. Her geography, history, and place in the European power structure all dictated an approach that relied upon a centralized and autocratic politico-economic system, which justified expansion on religious, racial, and geopolitical terms and involved numerous military conflicts with other powers.

Despite these major differences, Russia and America maintained friendly relations throughout most of the nineteenth century. Secretary of State William Seward noted in 1861 that this was largely because their expansion was taking place on opposite sides of the globe and therefore involved few conflicting interests. Those interests that conflicted, most notably in Latin America and the Pacific Northwest, were of secondary importance to Russia and not as important as the common opponent both powers faced in their expansion--Great Britain. Possession of this common enemy, as well as lack of seriously conflicting interests, meant that differences arising between the two powers were settled amicably and relations in general remained excellent.

By the 1890s, however, serious conflict began to develop. Fulfilling Seward's prediction, the two powers continued to expand across the globe in opposite directions until, by the end of the century, they found themselves face to face in Manchuria. The meeting was anything but pleasant, as America's "open door" approach to economic expansion in Asia collided with Russian state-trading practices and political control. Simultaneously, previously unimportant ideological differences assumed major proportions. Czarist repression of political dissidents and Jews increased during this period and became linked with actions against American missionaries and travelers in Russian-controlled territory. Fearful of increased immigration by unwanted, repressed people from Russia as well as morally outraged by czarist activities, the United States began to protest what the Russians considered purely internal matters that were none of America's business. As with trade and politics in Manchuria, this clash in effect involved a collision between the "open" American and "closed" Russian systems. In political, economic, territorial, and moral terms, each power began to view itself as acting defensively and properly against the aggressions of the other.

Between 1899 and 1911 these conflicts grew and reached crisis proportions. The Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900, enunciating the American policy of peaceful economic expansion and preservation of Chinese territorial integrity, were largely directed against Russian activities in the Far East. While paying lip service to the notes, Russia continued to practice her traditional expansionist and exclusionist policies in Manchuria, while simultaneously warning the United States not to interfere in matters of internal Russian politics and religion. By 1904 relations between the two countries had deteriorated to such an extent that President Theodore Roosevelt defined Russia as a major threat in the Far East and actively encouraged Japanese action against the Russians. The ensuing Russo-Japanese war was in many ways an American war by proxy, despite Roosevelt's eventual mediation. In 1911 American anger over continued political and religious repression in Russia led to the abrogation of the Russian-American trade treaty. And during World War I fear of Russian domination of Europe tempered American sympathy for the Allied powers.

The overthrow of the Czarist government and American entry into World War I in early 1917 led to a sharp improvement in relations, but that improvement quickly disappeared when the Marxist Bolsheviks under Lenin seized power in late 1917. Denouncing capitalism, the war, and liberalism in general as frauds, the Bolsheviks overthrew the Russian provisional government, established a proletarian dictatorship, nationalized private property, denounced religion, withdrew from the war, and called upon the workers of the world to rise up against their

governments. The Allied response was nonrecognition, aid to anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, and military intervention in the ensuing civil war. Viewing the Bolsheviks as a serious ideological threat to his plans for a liberal postwar world run by the United States, President Woodrow Wilson also responded with a series of statements, most notably his Fourteen Points speech, enunciating his liberal alternative to Lenin's view of the war and postwar world.

This early attempt to win the "hearts and minds" of the peoples of the world helped to make Wilson the moral leader of the Allies, but neither Wilsonian statements nor Allied troops proved capable of stopping the Bolsheviks from establishing control in Russia. At Versailles the Allies created a series of buffer states out of former Russian territory in order to isolate the dreaded Bolsheviks as they continued their policy of nonrecognition. In effect, the Cold War and the later American policy of "containment" already had begun.

The Bolshevik Revolution did not create the Cold War, however, for serious Russian-American antagonism clearly had preceded the events of 1917-18. Indeed, in one way the revolution simply brought Russian-American relations back to their pre-1917 state by snapping the new and fragile bonds of common interest and ideology that had been created by the war and the overthrow of the czar. On another level, however, the Bolsheviks added a new layer to this antagonism by providing Russia with a modern and effective ideology with which to combat the United States and justify its own expansion. Consequently, the two powers now claimed to represent the "wave of the future" with crusading ideologies that were in many ways the secular, modern equivalents of religion in international affairs. Liberalism and communism both rationalized national expansion in the name of a holy, international vision and spurred their believers on to even greater efforts in their behalf and against each other.

During the interwar years, however, Russian and American power were still latent to a great extent and temporarily checked by internal difficulties. Furthermore, both countries, along with Britain and France, found themselves challenged by a third force fusing expansion with ideology--Fascist Germany and Japan. This challenge led to a thaw and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1933, but subsequent attempts to form an alliance against the Fascist Axis powers foundered on old suspicions and fears as well as conflicting policies. By 1939 Soviet leader Josef Stalin concluded that British appeasement and American isolation constituted an effort to deceive him with talk of united action, while in reality encouraging the Axis to attack Russia. His response to this perceived threat, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, ensured the outbreak of World War II, turned Hitler back against the West, and enabled Russia to reconquer the Eastern European territory lost during World War I. It also convinced the Americans, who already had felt repulsion at the Soviet purge trials of the 1930s, that no real difference existed between the Nazis and the Soviets and that Moscow was indeed part of a Fascist conspiracy to conquer the world. As a result, Soviet-American relations reached a nadir in the period 1939-41.

Hitler's invasion of Russia in June of 1941 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor six months later forced these antagonistic powers and Britain into an alliance of necessity. Since military

victory would be possible only if the three powers remained united, they temporarily buried their deep differences and thereby succeeded in defeating their common enemies. In the process new bonds of cooperation and friendship were formed, bonds that many hoped would enable the Allies to retain their unity in the postwar era and establish a peaceful, stable world.

These hopes unfortunately remained unfulfilled. Part of the problem lay in the fact that World War II left the United States and Russia as the only major powers; in this situation and without a common enemy to keep them united, their postwar policies naturally diverged. Equally, if not more important, the World War II alliance did not erase past suspicion and antagonism, or effectively reconcile divergent views and policies. To the contrary, in many ways it reinforced these ill feelings and conflicts and then kept them buried only long enough to win the war. Once victory was achieved, they reemerged in full force.

Wartime divergencies centered on the sharply differing positions and perspectives of the two countries regarding both the war itself and the postwar world. Forced to bear the brunt of the casualties and devastation in yet another war against Germany, Russia demanded not only massive military assistance but also postwar security in the form of retention of the lands reconquered in 1939-41, control of the rest of Eastern Europe, and permanent destruction of German power. For the United States postwar security meant a world open to American capital and ideas rather than one divided into closed spheres, and Washington therefore refused to agree to Russian plans for Eastern Europe. This unwillingness, combined with Western inability to provide massive military assistance via a second front in France until 1944, only heightened Soviet suspicion that the United States wished to weaken Russia during and after the war and to dominate the entire globe herself. Simultaneously, Soviet political demands heightened American fears of expansionist postwar Russian goals. In effect, the "open" American and "closed" Soviet systems and conceptions of the world were once again colliding, with each side viewing its own activities as defensive and its opponent's actions as aggressive.

These major differences, symbolized throughout 1944 and 1945 by heated arguments over the future of Poland, were held in check during the war in order to maintain unity for the defeat of Germany. Once that defeat was an accomplished fact, however, they reemerged with startling swiftness and revealed a fast-crumbling alliance, heightened suspicions, and hardened negotiations. By 1946 the two sides had reached an impasse over the future of Germany, the rest of Europe, and control of atomic energy, to name but a few growing conflicts, and they found themselves locked in a major confrontation over postwar control of Iran.

Public explanations of these conflicts emphasized their ideological rather than geopolitical nature, which in turn heightened the tension and mobilized popular opinion for a long-term global struggle. Such public statements reached their apogee in early 1947 with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine.

From 1947 through 1950 each side enunciated and implemented its policy for global conflict, repressed internal dissent, tested the other's will in a series of crises, and solidified its position. For the United States this policy and process was defined as "containment" not only of the Soviet Union but also of the nationalist and left-wing

forces in the third world who were incorrectly perceived as Soviet puppets. Containment would dominate U.S. foreign and domestic policy for the next twenty-five years and would lead the country into some of the most divisive wars and internal conflicts in its history.

In retrospect, while the Cold War may have begun officially with the end of World War II, its roots and causes date back over one hundred years. Primarily, the conflict represents a worldwide power struggle between two expansionist superpowers who are driven by both geopolitical concerns and a world-embracing ideology, and whose opposing views of the world are the result of their unique histories and geographical positions. World War II and its aftermath did not create these differences; it only sharpened them and enabled both powers to emerge as the giants of the world so that their conflict would continue on a global scale. Unlike previous power struggles, however, this one involves the use of weapons capable of destroying the entire human race, and so far it therefore has fallen short of total military conflict.

Professor Mark Stoler
Department of History
University of Vermont

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CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT, 1893-1920

Serious conflict between the United States and Russia first developed during the 1890s over both domestic and international issues. Repressive Czarist actions against political dissidents and Jews led to official American protests and to a growing American antipathy toward the despotic Russian government. Simultaneously, Russian and American diplomatic interests began to collide in the Far East, most notably over the question of trade and control in Manchuria. Enunciated at the turn of the century, America's famous "open door" policy was aimed partially at preventing Russian control over Manchuria and a subsequent end to U.S. economic expansion in the area. While paying lip service to the open door in 1899, Russia continued to ignore it and, in fact, closed the door to American interests. The resulting conflict led to a severe deterioration in relations during the first decade of the twentieth century.

The overthrow of the czar and his replacement by a liberal provisional government in early 1917, combined with American entry into World War I as an ally of Russia, resulted in a sharp improvement in relations. In late 1917, however, the Bolsheviks under Lenin overthrew the provisional government and began a series of radical moves to remake Russian society, withdraw from the war, and overthrow the existing, worldwide capitalist order. The American and Allied response was nonrecognition of the new government, a reformulation of liberal war aims to counteract Bolshevik propaganda, and a series of attempts to overthrow Lenin that ranged from aid to anti-Bolshevik forces to actual military intervention.

These efforts were complicated and hindered by a host of factors, ranging from the war itself to Russian nationalism and American distrust of the other allies. By 1920 the intervention and anti-Bolshevik forces clearly had failed. Never a strong supporter of military intervention, President Wilson withdrew American forces. Simultaneously, however, the United States continued to refuse any recognition of a government it considered hostile to its interests, ideals, and very existence. The break between the former "friends" was now complete.

CHAPTER II

THE FAILURE OF RAPPROCHEMENT, 1921-39

Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Russia was not followed by any improvement in Soviet-American relations. Indeed, from 1921 to 1933 three separate Republican administrations maintained Woodrow Wilson's original nonrecognition policy on the grounds of Soviet repudiation of wartime debts and continued promotion of international revolution through the Comintern. In late 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt finally reversed this policy and formal diplomatic relations were established via an exchange of notes. Americans hoped that this recognition would lead to a settlement of old disputes and to increased Soviet-American trade to combat the Great Depression, while the Soviets hoped that it would result in American diplomatic support for Russia's "united front" policy against German and Japanese aggression.

None of these hopes materialized, and instead the old problems continued unabated. By 1939 the combination of the failure to improve trade, the continuation of old disputes, and horror over the Soviet purge trials and police state had thoroughly alienated most Americans. To the Soviets, however, the failure to solve old problems or increase trade was the result of American intransigence. Equally if not more important, American failure to agree to a united policy against the Axis powers meshed in the Soviet mind with Anglo-French appeasement as part of a conspiracy to turn the Axis powers against Russia while the West stood by.

Such disillusionment, suspicion, and bitterness culminated in a reversal of Soviet foreign policy and the subsequent signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939. With the failure of rapprochement, Russia had become a virtual ally of Nazi Germany as World War II began.

CHAPTER III

FROM ENMITY TO ALLIANCE, 1939-42

Soviet-American relations reached a new low point between September 1939 and June 1941. While Nazi Germany conquered Poland, the low countries, and France, Russia invaded and seized eastern Poland, the Baltic States, and Bessarabia, and made war on Finland. To the Soviets these moves were a justifiable recapture of territories lost during World War I, but to the Americans they constituted naked aggression that marked Russia as no different from the detested Nazis. As Washington moved closer and closer to full belligerency against Hitler, Soviet-American relations continued to deteriorate to the point of near rupture.

This trend suddenly was reversed by Hitler's June 1941 attack on the Soviet Union and by formal American entry into World War II in December 1941. Recognizing the common danger Germany posed, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States quickly buried their long-standing differences and signed a series of aid agreements and alliances. Beneath the surface, however, the old conflicts and suspicions remained. Still fearful that the West might abandon Russia, Soviet leader Josef Stalin remained neutral in the war against Japan, and he quickly demanded from his new allies both a military commitment in the form of a "second front" in France and a political commitment in the form of recognition of his 1941 borders. Unable to launch a second front, unwilling to recognize Stalin's East European conquests, and equally suspicious of his motives, Washington and London refused. By the beginning of 1942 these disagreements appeared just as dangerous to the fragile alliance as Axis military victories.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRANGE AND STRAINED ALLIANCE, 1942-43

Throughout 1942 and 1943 Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States engaged in two very different struggles: a military one against the Axis powers and a diplomatic one to overcome mutual suspicions and keep the Grand Alliance together. Each power was well aware of the fact that military victory could be achieved only if the three countries remained united, but continued conflict over military strategy and Soviet boundaries, combined with a series of serious military defeats, threatened on numerous occasions to destroy the Grand Alliance.

By mid-1943 Allied victories in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Stalingrad, Kursk, and the Pacific had succeeded in stopping the Axis advance and gaining the military initiative in the war. Simultaneously, however, continued disagreement over the second front, boundaries in Eastern Europe, and a host of other matters led to hostility within the Alliance. During the summer of 1943 rumors of a separate peace on the Eastern front and Soviet communization of central and Eastern Europe filled the air.

A series of conferences during the last few months of 1943, most notably the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and the first "Big Three" meeting at Tehran, succeeded in quelling these rumors, compromising Allied differences, and laying the basis for wartime and postwar cooperation. Beneath the surface, however, suspicion remained high. In reality, that suspicion had been increased sharply by the events of 1942 and 1943, and it was temporarily buried only because of the need to remain united if victory over the Axis was to be achieved.

CHAPTER V

DISCORD IN VICTORY, 1944-45

The combination of post-Tehran Allied unity and military victories resulted in Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945, and in hopes for quick victory over Japan. But German and Japanese defeats in turn led to the creation of a worldwide power vacuum and to the emergence of two superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union--who were intent on filling that vacuum according to their separate plans for a secure and peaceful postwar world.

Unfortunately, these postwar plans differed so drastically that they were to a great extent mutually exclusive; in reality, one country's vision of security and peace was the other country's vision of insecurity and war. For the Soviets, the permanent destruction of Germany and postwar control of adjacent areas, most notably Eastern Europe, were the essential preconditions to the establishment of a healthy and safe world. For the Americans and their weakened British ally, however, a healthy and safe world equated to one that was totally open to Western capital and ideas and included a Europe not dominated by any single power, be it Germany or Russia. As the Red Army moved through Eastern Europe in 1944 and forcibly imposed the control it deemed essential, it brought to the surface past Anglo-American suspicions of Soviet goals. Vehement protests by Washington and London led in turn to an increase in Soviet suspicion of Western goals and to further disagreement and distrust. Throughout 1944 bitter arguments over the future government of Poland served as a symbol for these deeper differences and suspicions.

All three allies were aware of the danger of another world war inherent in this conflict. During 1944 they therefore attempted to compromise their differences and to reach agreement in the numerous areas where their interests did not directly conflict. In February 1945 these efforts culminated in the Yalta conference and agreements, and in hopes for continued cooperation. Within the space of a few months, however, each side was accusing the other of violating the Yalta accords on Poland. Each was beginning also to view the other as a menace to its postwar plans.

CHAPTER VI

THE END OF THE ALLIANCE, APRIL TO DECEMBER 1945

Whether Franklin Roosevelt could have overcome the growing Soviet-American antagonism cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. What is certain is that his death and replacement by Harry Truman in April 1945, combined with Germany's surrender a few weeks later, hastened the split between the two superpowers. Although Truman claimed to be following Roosevelt's policy of cooperation, his gruff and assertive manner quickly brought Soviet-American relations to another crisis and necessitated a special mission by the ailing Harry Hopkins to prevent a total split. Hopkins's efforts temporarily succeeded, but by the summer of 1945 it was apparent that only the desire to defeat Japan and prevent another unwinnable world war still held the two allies together.

In July and August even these factors disappeared with the successful explosion of the American atomic bomb and the subsequent surrender of Japan. With total victory achieved, no common danger save the threat of a new war held the Alliance together. Buoyed by the possession of an "ultimate" weapon, Americans showed little fear of such a possibility and became more assertive in their negotiations. So did the frightened Soviets who tightened their grip on Eastern Europe, pressed for more territory, and rushed their own atomic bomb to completion.

The result was deadlock at the July Big Three Potsdam Conference and the ensuing foreign ministers' meetings. Although numerous minor agreements were hammered out by December, no accord emerged on the crucial issue of postwar treatment of Germany; instead, the temporary zones of occupation in that country and Europe as a whole became permanent.

Worried by the deterioration in relations, some administration officials such as Henry Stimson began to press during the fall for a return to the cooperative approach, but they were overruled by other advisers and the president. By the end of the year, debate within the War Department and the administration virtually had ended. The Soviets now were viewed as the enemy, an enemy as dangerous as Nazi Germany. With the "lessons" of the 1930s in their minds and the atomic bomb in their pockets, American officials dismissed compromise as appeasement and prepared for major confrontation. So did the Soviets.

CHAPTER VII

THE DECLARATION OF COLD WAR, 1946-47

In early 1946 two critical public statements announced to the world the growing split between Russia and the West: Stalin's 9 February address on the revival of Capitalist-Communist antagonism and Churchill's 5 March warning in Fulton, Missouri (with President Truman in attendance) that an "iron curtain" had descended across Eastern Europe. In Washington, Churchill's warnings were amplified by George F. Kennan who, in his famous "long telegram" of 22 February, analyzed Soviet hostility to the West and recommended a tough American response.

U.S. policymakers by this time had reached conclusions similar to Kennan's. The result in March was the first major Soviet-American confrontation of the postwar era. The specific issue was the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran, but behind this lay the larger issue of the conflicting Soviet and American plans for Europe and the entire postwar world.

In Iran the Soviets backed down under American pressure, but elsewhere they reacted with increasing belligerency to American toughness. By late 1946 they clearly had rejected American economic, political, and military proposals for the postwar world and had moved to consolidate their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The U.S. response consisted of continued protests, an end to reparations from the U.S. occupation zone in Germany, and plans to reunify portions of that country with or without Soviet agreement. By late 1946 British and American occupation zones had been merged into a single economic unit.

This move only served to reinforce Soviet fears of Western aggression at the very moment the West was acting because of its fear of Soviet aggression. In this "mirror image" situation, each side had concluded by late 1946 that the other constituted a revived Hitlerian threat to its security.

In early 1947, President Truman announced his perception of this threat and his proposed response. In the famous Truman Doctrine of 12 March, he interpreted a civil war in Greece and Russian demands regarding the Dardanelles as evidence of evil Soviet intentions, and he requested appropriations for military aid to the area so as to replace a weakened Britain in helping "free" peoples to resist internal subversion or external aggression. With this statement, the president made clear to the Soviets, the American people, and the rest of the world that the Cold War indeed had begun.

CHAPTER VIII

FORMALIZING BELLIGERENCY, 1947-49

The Truman Doctrine was followed by a series of statements that formalized the existence of a global cold war and outlined the rationales and strategies of each side. For the United States the most important of these statements was George F. Kennan's enunciation of the "containment" doctrine in July 1947 as the basic American strategy in the Cold War. To implement this doctrine, the administration simultaneously moved to order its global priorities, repress internal dissent, build up American armed forces, and begin major aid programs to key areas around the globe. The results of these efforts in 1947 included the famous Marshall Plan to aid West European economic recovery, a tough loyalty oath program, a new national military establishment and policy, military aid to areas on the Soviet periphery, and the acceleration of efforts to unify the western sections of Germany.

While the administration viewed these moves as defensive reactions to Soviet aggression, Moscow perceived all of them, especially the attempt to unify Western Germany, as extremely hostile and aggressive. As a result, the Russians in late 1947 and early 1948 responded in kind with their own defensive moves. These included bitter public denunciations of the United States, efforts to unify areas under Soviet control and repress internal dissent, revival of ideological warfare against all Capitalist countries, and subjugation of adjacent areas.

Soviet moves culminated in 1948 with the takeover of Czechoslovakia and the attempt to force the West out of Berlin via a blockade. The result was the most serious Soviet-American confrontation to date, an American airlift to neutralize the blockade, and the further acceleration of American plans for Germany and Western Europe. By early 1949 these American efforts had culminated in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a formal military alliance against Russia and in the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany.

With such a pattern of move and countermove firmly established, Russia and the United States now confronted each other as implacable enemies around the globe. The ensuing months witnessed Soviet detonation of an atomic device, Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, major spy revelations and a growing anti-Communist hysteria, and the commitment of American armed forces in Korea. However notable these events appeared to be in 1949 and 1950, they were in effect merely a continuation and amplification of the Cold War policies and patterns established between 1947 and early 1949.

CHAPTER I

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Formalizing Belligerency, 1947-49

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