PRIMA FICHE

GUIDE

THE ROUT OF THE 1932 BONUS ARMY FROM WASHINGTON

SR Scholarly Resources Inc.
Wilmington, Delaware

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors and publisher are grateful to the following for their permission to reprint selected material:

Herbert Hoover Presidential Library

Patrick J. Hurley Collection, Western History Collections of the University of Oklahoma Library

MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia

Collection 679
Glassford, Pelham Davis. Papers, ca. 1904-59
Special Collections
University Research Library
University of California, Los Angeles

Willard Edwards, "Bonus March Story Buried by Democrats." Copyrighted Chicago Tribune. Used with permission.

Richard N. Current, T. Harry Williams, and Frank Freidel, American History: A Survey. Copyrighted 1979. Reprinted by permission of Alfred A. Knopf Inc., New York.

H. L. Ingle and James A. Ward, American History: A Brief View, vol. 2. Copyrighted 1978. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown & Company, Boston.

John A. Garraty, The American Nation: A History of the United States Since 1865. Text copyrighted 1966, 1971, 1975, 1979 by John A. Garraty. Illustrations, maps, graphs, and related text copyrighted 1966, 1971 by Harper & Row Publishers Inc. Graphs, captions, and related text copyrighted 1975, 1979 by Harper & Row Publishers Inc., New York.

Bernard Bailyn et al., The Great Republic: A History of the American People. Copyrighted 1977. Reprinted by permission of D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Every effort has been made to reproduce the appearance and condition of the original documents or to present faithful transcription. Transcribed documents are indicated by an asterisk in the upper right-hand corner of the page.

FOREWORD

In the summer of 1932 an estimated 20,000 protesters, congenially known as the Bonus Expeditionary Forces, assembled in Washington. An overwhelming number were World War I veterans, and their prime objective was securing passage of legislation authorizing the immediate payment of Adjusted Service Certificates, popularly called "the bonus," extra payments then due to be paid to them in 1945. As the ranks of the BEF swelled, the House passed the desired legislation, which quickly died on the floor of the Senate. By mid-July most of the disappointed protesters had left the capital to a BEF vanguard comprised of several thousand bitter-enders. On 28 July, after violence marked attempts by district police to clear bonus squatters from a federal building, the U. S. Army operating under Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, cleared the district of all protesters in a show of force that included tear gas, tanks, and the burning of BEF campsites. After this episode, President Herbert Hoover indicated the necessity for military action and his own personal approval.

The rout of the Bonus Army remains a compelling event a half-century afterward. The pathos of the Great Depression hung over the camps, even as their militance challenged the beliefs of orthodox politics and policies. The perception of what actually happened and why, so clear to contemporaries in the summer of 1932, has been radically altered since historical perspective took on the apologies of major participants.

The Bonus Army protest movement itself has a very modern cast. While the 20,000-member BEF in one sense mirrored the needs of millions of desperate Americans, these veterans were in essence a single-issue pressure group seeking to extract from Congress benefits that would not be available to outsiders. They were countered by an administration devoted to fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, especially their prevailing belief that in order to maintain a balanced budget the federal government should appropriate even less money as its own revenues declined in the depression. Moreover, President Hoover resolutely feared the collective moral and psychological implications inherent in direct federal assistance to individuals.

Within the ensuing maelstrom, Hoover, beleaguered in an election year, his attention and energies elsewhere, was consistently ill-served and deceived by arch and unsympathetic subordinates concerning matters on the Bonus Army. While General MacArthur's refusal to obey presidential orders at the crucial moment may have contributed favorably to his reputation, it certainly proved harmful to Hoover's. District Police Commissioner Pelham D. Glassford, a West Point contemporary of MacArthur's and supporter and patron of the BEF, ultimately found his humanity a servant to too many masters. The presence of Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley--heavy-handed, unsympathetic, and deceptive--was felt everywhere.

Chapter VII describes a brief but fascinating counterpoint to the events of 1932 that occurred a year later when a smaller bonus army congregated in the Washington of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The new president's political abilities in this situation stand out in sharp relief when contrasted to those of Hoover.

In the final chapter of this collection, Professor Lisio provides a collection of documents that trace the evolution of the historical interpretation of the Bonus March through time. The initial consensus, which focused on the judgment and action of the Hoover administration, was replaced years later by allegations that Communist conspirators played a central role. The final pages of the last chapter provide typical examples of how the Bonus Army saga is interpreted in leading textbooks.

James F. Watts
Professor of History
The City College of New York

INTRODUCTION

On 28 July 1932 Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, ostensibly acting under the explicit orders of President Herbert Hoover, used a well-disciplined force of infantry, cavalry, and tanks to drive thousands of poor, depression-worn petitioners out of Washington, DC. Those driven at gunpoint from the city had been acclaimed only a few years earlier as the victorious heroes of World War I. But a relentless depression had robbed them of their livelihoods, their homes, and their hopes, and they had marched on Washington to beseech Congress and the president to pay them their promised "war bonus" in 1932 rather than in 1945 as originally authorized by Congress.

This confrontation, known as the Bonus March, captured national attention and sympathy as the World War I veterans and their families set up makeshift shacks in view of the nation's Capitol, marched to publicize their petition, and maintained an essentially peaceful lobby for two months. However, on 28 July the Bonus March ended in tragedy and became one of the most enduring and misunderstood episodes of the depression decade, one that continued to make news well into the 1950s.

The following documents deal with only a part of the more complicated story told in my book, The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy, and the Bonus Riot. The riot on 28 July, or more accurately the two "riotous" incidents that were combined and referred to as "the bonus riot," and the rout of the petitioners from the city by the army are the most dramatic and controversial events of the Bonus March. The president's response to the veterans' resistance and his defense of the rout cemented an impression of Hoover in the minds of the voters that would bedevil him throughout his life.

The story of Hoover's relations with the World War I veterans and the subsequent tragedy of July 1932 is filled with many ironies. Appearances all too often masked realities, and, because the president was an inept politician who believed he would be judged on the basis of his honest efforts to combat the depression rather than on contrived illusions of action, he proved unable and unwilling to educate political observers and to explain his position on this issue to the public. Therefore, he was incapable of gaining a high degree of understanding or sympathy for what he was attempting to accomplish. All too often Hoover's critics were given little reason to doubt that their misperceptions of his motives and intentions were accurate. In part, too, because he detested politicians as beneath him and viewed them as high-minded public servants, he must bear his share of the responsibility for failure to act as a skillful political leader and for the misunderstandings, confusions, and misconceptions that plagued him throughout his presidency and beyond.

However, Hoover did more to help the veterans of the war than any previous president. Despite his proveteran legislation, largely unpublicized, the veterans did not view him as their sympathetic, understanding friend but as an aloof, hostile, even cruel enemy who had abandoned them in their hour of great need. His reorganization of the three competing veteran agencies into the more efficient Veterans Administration created the erroneous impression that he was insensitive to veteran needs. His demand for benefits for veterans of earlier wars went unnoticed, while to his surprise the American Legion condemned his eventual support of hospital and pension benefits to all veterans with disabilities, even those who could not prove that their disabilities were directly service connected. Congress continued to pass veteran hospitalization and disability bills without regard to fairness and justice for veterans of past wars. Yet Hoover earned no gratitude for his veto of bills that he believed perpetrated and created inequities in the treatment of veterans of previous wars, or poorly conceived bills that would result in excessive burdens to the taxpayers.

The political power of the highly organized veterans groups, especially the American Legion and to a lesser extent the Veterans of Foreign Wars, was best understood and respected by members of the House of Representatives. The American Legion was especially effective in lobbying through bills that it deemed essential. The immediate payment of the World War bonus, rather than as scheduled in 1945, was not among the Legion's legislation priorities. However, as the depression worsened, sentiment among legionnaires for immediate payment began to grow, and to meet this pressure Hoover successfully marshaled all of his influence with Legion officials to prevent the bonus from becoming a Legion objective. Accordingly, he emerged as an apparent opponent of another popular veteran demand.

Hoover opposed the immediate payment of the bonus because he and his top advisers were convinced that the almost $4 billion needed to pay the veterans--a sum equal to the entire income of the federal government for 1930--would depress the stock market greatly by drawing available capital to the sale of government bonds, thus seriously hindering capital investment ventures at a time when the economy desperately needed to stimulate the flow of capital into job producing businesses rather than toward safer government bonds. Moreover, since the proposed cost of the bonus totaled the annual federal income, Hoover also feared the creation of the need to raise taxes. He already was convinced that the federal government had been generous to veterans. It projected expenditures to veterans of $900 million a year over the coming five years, about 21.5 percent of the federal income for the benefit of less than 4 percent of the population. While these calculations were rough estimates based on maximum costs to the government, they nonetheless revealed that as a special interest group the veterans had fared well under Hoover, with benefits rising 18 percent from 1928 to 1930. Clearly, the president had cause for believing that the $3.4 to $4 billion bonus expenditure was unwise during the depression crisis, a time of shrinking federal income, growing unemployment, and unprecedented economic collapse. Even if the hindsight of some Keynesian-oriented critics could later argue otherwise in retrospect, the fact remains that Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York and other liberals joined conservatives in agreeing with Hoover's opposition to immediate payment of the bonus.

Unemployed World War I veterans, in desperate need of the $1000 bonuses, saw the issue as one of simple justice to those who had risked their lives or ruined their health while others had stayed at home and prospered. They had earned that "bonus" and could not understand how Hoover could make huge loans to big business through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and yet refuse to make long overdue small payments to needy veterans. By 1932 their patience had ended and in the spring a spontaneous march of disgruntled veterans converged on Washington to lobby Congress and the president directly. The drama of tattered veterans arriving in boxcars and truckloads quickly captured the nation's attention. They came to petition only the narrow cause of the veterans, not for unemployment relief or comprehensive economic justice for the poor. Yet for many Americans the veterans' squalid "Hooverville" encampments in the capital were symbols representing the plight of all depressed people.

As the numbers descending upon the capital grew from hundreds to thousands, Hoover rejected advice to stop the demonstrations from entering the District of Columbia. He was told that Communists had taken control and would use the veterans to foment revolution. In spite of much confusion, misunderstanding, and anger, the president calmly took secret steps to enable the veterans to realize a peaceful lobbying effort. The War Department, the National Guard, the commissioner of the District of Columbia, the director of Public Buildings and Grounds, and other federal agencies were instructed to ensure the civil liberties of the demonstrators. They were provided with rudimentary shelter, federal land for camps, permission to occupy partially demolished buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue (which required a temporary halt to a top priority, job-creating $700 million federal office building program), and even medical aid. Hoover assiduously avoided personal publicity for his assistance, as he feared that more veterans and their families would be encouraged to join the march. As a result, only a few knew of the president's efforts, while the petitioners and most observers saw him only as hostile and aloof to their needs.

Superintendent of Police Pelham D. Glassford, a retired West Point graduate and war hero, took effective and humane control of the bonus army, or Bonus Expeditionary Force as it came to popularly be called. On the other hand, Glassford's immediate superiors, the District of Columbia commissioners, were intensely hostile to the marchers, their restraint a result only of the president's explicit wishes. For two months Glassford supervised and protected the BEF while 20,000 petitioners and their families lobbied the Congress. The BEF lobby eventually was victorious in the House, but it was then overwhelmingly defeated by the Senate. Suddenly, in mid-July with Congress adjourned until after the November elections, the well publicized daily activities of the BEF lost popular appeal. They had tried and failed and even now ardent supporters such as Texas Congressman Wright Patman urged the BEF to accept transportation "loans" (quietly pushed through Congress with Hoover's support) in order to return to their homes. While thousands accepted the loans, many more vowed to remain in the Capitol until the bonus was paid.

As the dispirited but stubborn veterans became increasingly disorganized, a small band of Communists grabbed news headlines with their rhetorical bombast. Many feared violence would result, and virtually every public official seemed to believe that Hoover must now, after

two months of patience, finally take more action to encourage the protesters to return home. With donations to the veterans rapidly diminishing and internal factionalism and bickering among both nonradical and radical factions becoming more serious every day, the BEF was subject to a host of disruptive pressures with which its leaders could no longer cope. Only Police Chief Glassford, by now a nationally popular hero for his humane treatment of the veterans, seemed to feel that some type of permanent camp was possible. Yet even he was vague and uncertain of how or where it could be created or the number of people it would be able to house.

It was under these circumstances that the president finally decided to withdraw the secret support he had been extending to the BEF and to allow those in his administration who favored eviction to take control of events, as he had been forced to turn his attention to more serious and complex depression problems. By deflecting his interest, Hoover allowed blundering subordinates to handle a highly sensitive, emotional problem that had enormous potential to damage him politically and personally. As the documents reveal, poor planning, breakdowns in communication, and the absence of one specific official with the clearly designated responsibility to coordinate the entire eviction process compounded the administration's mistakes. Ultimately, the president's critics came to believe that Hoover himself deliberately had planned and provoked the riot and then ordered the rout of the protesters in order to demonstrate the continued need for a strong president in the midst of depression and insurrection.

Although clearly dismayed by the veterans' repeated resistance to police orders and by the two riotous incidents that convinced police officers serving under Glassford that troops were necessary, Hoover sought to place strict limits on the role of the army in assisting the police. Nevertheless, MacArthur gained control and despite Hoover's repeated orders to the contrary, he drove all of the petitioners out of the capital. Both Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley and Chief of Staff MacArthur, two of Hoover's most trusted advisers, constantly reassured the president that the army had no alternative to the rout because it had faced a dangerous Communist conspiracy to foment insurrection and revolution, and the president and his allies therefore felt that the rout of the petitioners had been justified. The president's critics, on the other hand, saw a very different conspiracy. They believed in a Hoover conspiracy--that he had entered into a vicious plot to use force against the poor in the hopes of reshaping the voters' perception of him as a strong, decisive leader who knew how to guide the nation through the dangerous depression crisis.

Despite their popularity, neither of these straightforward conspiratorial explanations proved to be entirely accurate. However, they continued to exist throughout the 1950s and even today are found in current accounts written on the subject.

Donald J. Lisio
Henrietta Arnold Professor of History
Coe College

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bernstein, Irving. The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933. New York, 1972.
Bernstein has an excellent, concise chapter that relies heavily on the Pelham D. Glassford Papers. Neither Bernstein nor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (see below) had access to the Hoover Papers.

Daniels, Roger. The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression. Westport, CT, 1971.

Hoover, Herbert. "Russian Misadventure." Collier's 105 (27 April 1940).

Hunt, Frazier. The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur. New York, 1954.

James, Clayton D. The Years of MacArthur, 1880-1941. Boston, 1970.

Lisio, Donald J. The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy, and the Bonus Riot. Columbia, MO, 1974.
Includes an extensive bibliography essay.

_____. "A Blunder Becomes Catastrophe: Hoover, the Legion, and the Bonus Army." Wisconsin Magazine of History 51:37-50.

Lohbeck, Don. Patrick J. Hurley. Chicago, 1956.

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933. Boston, 1957.

CHAPTER I

PROLOGUE TO TRAGEDY

For several weeks prior to the outbreak of the riot, the federal government had been concerned with the size and activities of the Bonus Army as it gradually assembled in Washington. Particular interest was focused on the meetings of Communist groups, even the smallest of which produced observation and reports. These weeks also witnessed the emergence of Major Pelham D. Glassford, superintendent of the Metropolitan Police Department, as a central figure in the entire affair. Glassford's basic sympathy with the marchers' cause was displayed in his attempts to provide the various encampments with housing, food, health, and sanitary facilities. At the White House, President Hoover received regular reports on conditions throughout the city. After the Senate's adjournment on 17 June without passing the bonus legislation, the president urged the marchers to return to their homes.

CHAPTER II

PREPARING FOR EVACUATION, 23 JUNE-26 JULY 1932

When Congress adjourned in mid-July without approving the bonus, the Hoover administration searched for ways to encourage the petitioners to return home. To transport the veterans back to their homes, Congress provided loans, hinting that if the veterans accepted them Congress would later convert the loans to gifts. Public sympathy for the BEF now began to erode. They had tried unsuccessfully for two months to convince Hoover and the Congress, but there simply was not enough support for an expensive veterans' bonus with so many other immediate Depression needs. Few, if any, public officials, or even ardent BEF defenders, would sanction a permanent occupation of the federal buildings and parks in which the BEF had erected their flimsy shelters. Hoover and his administrative officials had joined with district officials to cooperate with the protesters during the weeks of petitioning, but with the congressional adjournment, pressures for the veterans' removal began to build once again. Congressmen and other supporters urged the veterans to return home. A sizable number, however, decided to remain in the capital and vowed to stay as long as necessary until Congress and Hoover approved the bonus.

Among those urging action to remove the veterans was George W. Rhine, owner of the salvage and wrecking company that was charged with preparing the area for a top-priority $700 million federal office building project for the capital. Not only would this project create needed federal office space but also provide thousands of jobs. After costly delays to facilitate the BEF protest, Rhine complained that the veterans occupying the partially demolished buildings along Pennsylvania Avenue were stripping them of all salvageable materials and that the lengthy delay in completing the demolition was bankrupting his company. He demanded action. Since removal of the veterans would be a complex, emotional, and therefore potentially politically damaging undertaking, Hoover should have paid closer personal attention. Already overburdened with the numerous details of implementing the new legislation to combat the Depression, and only recently authorized by the Congress, the beleaguered president left the task to his often inept and insensitive subordinates.

The initial evacuation plan was intended to be a strictly limited one, designed to meet Rhine's demands. However, it also became a public test of wills between the federal authorities and the District of Columbia Commissioners, on the one hand, and the reluctant veterans and their champion, District Police Chief Pelham D. Glassford, on the other. Legal complications, delays, shortened tempers, and considerable misunderstanding over evacuation responsibilities and plans ensued in the week prior to the actual eviction on 28 July 1932.

CHAPTER III

RIOT AND ROUT, 27-29 JULY 1932

Amidst raucous avowals of resistance from the veterans, administrative officials cautiously untangled legal snarls surrounding the evacuation and prepared themselves for the potential rioting. The Justice Department neither anticipated mass arrests nor the need for a "special prison camp." Yet Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley and Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur carefully researched and prepared legal documents that would be necessary in case the army was called to put down a major riot. Hurley advised the president of the army's plan to act under a presidential proclamation, giving the army authority to arrest and transport all resisters by truck to their home states. Although Hoover talked with Hurley on 27 July 1932, the president's subsequent actions revealed that he did not foresee the need for the army's eviction plan.

The events of the morning and afternoon of 28 July are fascinating and complex. The documents provide eyewitness accounts that stress differing perceptions of the seriousness of the veterans' resistance. After the attempts of the police to evict the veterans peacefully, two riots occurred. Police Chief Pelham D. Glassford later recalled that he did not specifically request the District of Columbia Commissioners to ask Hoover for federal troops. On the other hand, his own police officers strongly questioned Glassford's judgment on the seriousness of the confrontation. Following the first battle involving bricks, the commissioners accepted Glassford's assurances of police control. The second attack on the police took place shortly afterward and resulted in a shooting and one fatality. Without consulting Glassford but acting on the advice of police officers, the commissioners requested that Hoover send in the troops. In so doing, they erroneously informed the president that Major Glassford himself had made the request, thus creating a discrepancy that in the future created contention.

The ensuing rout of the protesters and their families was one of the most politically damaging acts of recent American history. Tanks, cavalry, and troops armed with tear gas drove out and pursued the squatters in the half-demolished downtown buildings as well as in the outlying areas. Hurley and MacArthur played crucial roles, although Hoover, in rejecting their emergency proclamation, limited the army's role to clearing the riot areas in cooperation with Glassford's district police.

Extensive reports detail the rout of the protesters, MacArthur's control of events, and Glassford's instant acceptance of MacArthur's claim that the president had ordered him to drive the protesters out of the city. Other eyewitness accounts of the BEF's conduct call into serious question the versions given to the press by the secretary of war and the chief of staff.

The events are further complicated by Glassford's personal regard for General MacArthur, his obvious sympathy for the marchers notwithstanding. In 1951, when President Truman fired MacArthur, Glassford strongly defended his old West Point friend, recalling that the general's plan to disperse the bonus protesters of 1932 "was brilliant and magnificently carried out." Unable to conceive of a chief of staff deliberately disobeying a presidential order, Glassford had cooperated closely with MacArthur during the riots and rout. Even while later critical of the policy and actions of the government, Glassford found only praise for the general.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEFENSE

Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley and General Douglas MacArthur assured President Hoover that the Bonus March proved that the capital, and perhaps the nation, had faced up to a very serious threat. Swayed by their persuasive skills and relying upon their assurances, Hoover issued a public statement immediately after the riot, blaming the Communists and criminal elements within the BEF for creating a situation that necessitated the use of troops. In so doing, he seemed to condone the rout. Harsh criticisms were soon directed at Hoover and produced his own second thoughts, prompting the president to request that Hurley and MacArthur explain why they had failed to follow his initial orders. Again, their "first-hand" representations of the situation and their persuasiveness satisfied Hoover that military force had been essential.

This was unfortunately a serious mistake. Hoover should have insisted upon their public explanation or some form of disciplinary action, but instead Hurley strongly advised Hoover to call less attention to the issue, insisting that the press was solidly behind the president. However, Hurley's statement to the press on 3 August revealed his own growing awareness of the intense public revulsion to the gunpoint rout of downtrodden citizens from the capital. Yet by then it was too late to change his story. Hoover remained convinced that the protesters were troublemakers, if not insurrectionists, and decided to accept full responsibility. He refused to blame MacArthur for disobeying his orders.

The administration's defense reiterated the charge that radical and criminal elements now controlled the Bonus March. However, when intensive investigation by the Justice Department, Military Intelligence, Veterans Bureau, and local police failed to uncover evidence of direct involvement by Communists or lawbreakers, administration officials became desperate. In an attempt to impeach the character of the entire BEF, they sent names and fingerprints of veterans, who had applied for federal loans and who already had returned home prior to the 28 July riot, to their local police in order to determine what percentage of the peaceful protesters had criminal records. Attorney General William D. Mitchell then prepared the administration's defense on such "evidence."

CHAPTER V

THE EPISODE AT JOHNSTOWN

When the Bonus Expeditionary Forces and their families fled the capital, they dispersed in all directions without time to gather either their belongings or much less to plan their retreat. Eventually, many of these refugees moved toward Johnstown, Pennsylvania, where Mayor Eddie McCloskey welcomed them and even helped to establish a temporary camp. The following report by J. Prentice Murphy is the best documentation of the Johnstown experience. The continued plight of the BEF kept their story before the American people for weeks after the army dispersal on 28 July 1932.

CHAPTER VI

MOUNTING THE POLITICAL DEFENSE: THE HOOVER ADMINISTRATION AND THE AMERICAN LEGION

Hoover and his advisers feared that the politically powerful American Legion would punish the administration for the rout of the BEF by suddenly passing a resolution favoring the immediate payment of the bonus, or possibly by passing an official censure of the president, as the Veterans of Foreign Wars already had done. Thus, the administration put forth its most ardent effort to defend itself before the Legion's national convention in Portland, Oregon. Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley traveled to Portland to use his influence with past national commanders of the Legion and other influential Legion officials. And Veterans Administrator Frank T. Hines alerted his most loyal and important cadre of legionnaires to stop the censure and immediate payment efforts at the state Legion conventions.

The centerpiece of the defense, hurriedly compiled for release just prior to the Legion's national convention, was a twenty-page report by U.S. Attorney General William D. Mitchell. Basing his arguments on information gathered by a number of federal agencies, Mitchell sought to prove that the administration had faced a large mob of criminals and Communists bent upon violence, and, therefore, that the administration had no choice but to drive them from the city in order to prevent even more serious consequences.

Attorney General Mitchell distorted the evidence and twisted the facts to such a degree that Police Chief Pelham D. Glassford, who previously had remained relatively silent, responded in a press release that rebutted the attorney general. Glassford's careful response had a devastating impact. Although Legion officials who were loyal to the administration stopped efforts to condemn Hoover and pass a resolution favoring immediate payment of the bonus, they were not able to block those who took out their anger on Secretary of War Hurley, officially censuring him for a minor error, but thereby revealing their distrust and distaste for President Hoover and his administration.

Additional documents in this chapter reveal that revulsion for the administration's action was arising simultaneously from a variety of other sources. Democratic party stalwarts like Congressman Wright Patman of Texas actively involved themselves, and many newspaper reports were similarly hostile to the administration's defense.

CHAPTER VII

ROOSEVELT BATTLES THE BONUS

Although his opposition to immediate bonus payments to veterans matched that of Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt's sagacity protected his administration from damaging political confrontations. Ultimately, Roosevelt lost the battle without suffering political damage.

As Roosevelt and his New Deal platform entered office in March 1933, still another contingent of the bonus army began to congregate in Washington. Dramatic threats, demands, and promises again filled the nation's capital. The Communist party was particularly active, especially with organizing their camps in suburban Virginia.

The failure of this protest (and another less remembered one in 1934) to attain significant momentum resulted from the dexterous handling of the situation by the White House. Accommodations to the protesters, within carefully drafted guidelines, allowed the administration to gain favor among the men. More important, the government provided an attractive option by inviting protesters to register for jobs or job training in connection with New Deal programs.

Ironically, what these dramatic protests failed to achieve traditional political action accomplished. Roosevelt, citing Hoover's familiar economic arguments, twice vetoed bonus payments. Yet in 1936 Congress overrode presidential opposition, and veterans succeeded in obtaining the restoration of many benefits that Roosevelt had sought to eliminate.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BONUS ARMY'S MARCH INTO HISTORY

As time passed, the events of 28 July 1932 slowly faded and recollections and interpretations gradually shifted. Herbert Hoover's judgment and the roles played by MacArthur, Hurley, and Glassford remained at the center of whatever attention Americans continued to pay to the Bonus March for more than fifteen years afterward. The documents in this chapter reveal various historical interpretative changes revolving around the events of the Bonus Army.

The period of Republican defensiveness came to an abrupt end in 1949, when Eleanor Roosevelt stated in her memoirs that President Hoover had ordered the troops to "fire on the veterans." Countercharges and threats of litigation brought an apology from the former First Lady. Simultaneously, the rise of red-baiting to major proportions in Washington produced a climate favorable to conspiracy theories. The allegations of a reformed Communist, a veteran of the Bonus Army, produced the widespread conviction among politicians and journalists that the BEF had been manipulated by the Communist party as part of Moscow's determination to smear Hoover. MacArthur, by extension, became part of this explanation, particularly after his 1951 firing by President Truman.

Contemporary textbook accounts of the complete Bonus Army saga tend to reinforce the central role played by Communists, either in the unfolding of the events themselves or as major facts in determining the actions of Hoover and his subordinates.

GUIDE TO LOCATING DOCUMENTS

Individual documents can be located by referring to the right-hand column on the list of citations. The first set of letters is an abbreviated title to the specific primafiche program and is followed by the microfiche card number. The second letter and number determines the actual document location within a particular chapter.

The images on the microfiche card are arranged on a grid. Each card contains ninety-eight images consisting of seven rows of fourteen frames. The horizontal rows are identified numerically one through fourteen and the vertical rows are listed alphabetically A through G. Therefore, if a document is located at C-12 it can be found on the third row down on the twelfth frame.

CHAPTER I

Prologue to Tragedy

W. P. Sager and R. E. Williams to Captain J. A. Sullivan (Crime Prevention Bureau), 21 May 1932, Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA (hereafter cited as HHPL). BA-1 A-13

Memorandum, S. M. Scott (private, Crime Prevention Bureau) to Sullivan, 23 May 1932, HHPL. BA-1 A-14

Memorandum by A. Friedberg and Scott, 23 May 1932, HHPL. BA-1 B-1

Memorandum, Scott to Sullivan, 25 May 1932, HHPL. BA-1 B-2

Memorandum, Friedberg, W. C. Grooms, and Scott to Sullivan, 27 May 1932, HHPL. BA-1 B-3

Memorandum, W. J. DyBusky to Sullivan, 27 May 1932, HHPL. BA-1 B-4

Memorandum, Grooms and Friedberg to Sullivan, 2 June 1932, HHPL. BA-1 B-5

Report by Captain Kelly, 8 June 1932, HHPL. BA-1 B-7

Report by J. O. Patton and J. Apostolides, 9 June 1932, HHPL. BA-1 B-8

Memorandum by Apostolides and A. E. Fredette, 9 June 1932, HHPL. BA-1 B-9

Speech by William Power [enclosure in Scott to Sullivan, 9 June 1932], HHPL. BA-1 B-10

Pelham D. Glassford (major and superintendent, Metropolitan Police Department) to Ferry K. Heath (assistant secretary, Treasury Department), 10 June 1932, HHPL. BA-1 C-8

Heath to Glassford, 10 June 1932, HHPL. BA-1 C-9

Daily report on Bonus March, 10 June 1932, HHPL. BA-1 C-10

Memorandum by Fredette and Apostolides, 11 June 1932, HHPL. BA-1 C-11

CHAPTER II

Preparing for Evacuation, 23 June-26 July 1932

Memorandum, L. R. [Lawrence Richey, secretary to president] to President Herbert C. Hoover, 23 June 1932, Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA (hereafter cited as HHPL). BA-2 A-4

Memorandum [Richey] to Hoover, 23 June 1932, HHPL. BA-2 A-6

Memorandum by John Apostolides (private, Metropolitan Police, Crime Prevention Division), 23 June 1932, HHPL. BA-2 A-7

Richey to General Douglas MacArthur (chief of staff), 24 June 1932 [with two enclosures, including one dated 24 June 1932, Frank T. Hines (administrator) to Hoover], HHPL. BA-2 A-8

Memorandum, S. M. Scott (private, Crime Prevention Bureau) to Captain J. A. Sullivan (Crime Prevention Bureau), 26 June 1932, HHPL. BA-2 A-14

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Ferry K. Heath to Major and Superintendent Pelham D. Glassford, 27 June 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-1

Memorandum, MacArthur to Richey, 28 June 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-2

Hines to Richey, 28 June 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-3

Memorandum by Inspector Edwards, 30 June 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-4

Memorandum by Apostolides and A. E. Fredette, 1 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-6

Memorandum by Fredette, 2 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-7

Memorandum by Fredette, 4 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-9

Memorandum by Apostolides and Fredette, 4 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-10

Memorandum by Apostolides and Fredette, 5 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 B-11

Memorandum by A. Friedberg, 13 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 D-12

Memorandum by Apostolides and Fredette, 13 July 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL. BA-2 D-13

Memorandum, Hines to Hoover, 14 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-1

Memorandum by Scott, 14 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-2

Memorandum, Hines to Hoover, 15 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-3

Telegram, Richey to Henry M. Robinson, 15 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-4

Memorandum, Patton to Sullivan, 15 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-5

Memorandum by Scott, 15 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-7

Memorandum by Fredette, 15 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-8

Memorandum by Scott, 15 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-9

Memorandum, Hines to Hoover, 16 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 E-10

"Senate Rejects Cash Payment," Foreign Service (July 1932): 6, 8. Foreign Service was the national magazine of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. BA-2 E-11

"Anti-Veteran Congress Session Comes to Close," Foreign Service (August 1932): 6-7. BA-2 E-13

Memorandum, Hines to Hoover, 18 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 F-1

Memorandum by William T. Murphy, 18 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 F-2

Memorandum by Fredette, 18 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 F-3

Memorandum by Scott, 18 July 1932, HHPL. BA-2 F-5

Memorandum, Hines to Hoover, 19 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 F-6
Memorandum by Patton, 19 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 F-7
Memorandum by Edwards, 19 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 F-8
Memorandum by Rone, 19 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 F-9
Heath to Herbert B. Crosby (police commissioner), 20 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 F-11
Memorandum by Friedberg, 20 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 F-12
Heath to Glassford, 20 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 F-13
Heath to Rhine & Company, 20 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 F-14
Memorandum by M. K. Reading, 20 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-1
Memorandum, Hines to Hoover, 21 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-2
U. S. Grant (director, Public Buildings and Public Parks) to L. H. Reichelderfer (president, Board of Commissioners), 21 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-3
Daniel E. Garges (secretary, Board of Commissioners) to Glassford, 21 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-4
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Seymour Lowman to Glassford, 21 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-5
Lowman to Crosby, 21 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-6
Memorandum by Scott, 21 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-7
Memorandum, Hines to Hoover, 22 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-9
Memorandum, Glassford to commissioners, 22 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-2 G-10

President's telephone memorandum, 26 July 1932, HHPL. BA-3 B-13

Memorandum, Hines to Hoover, 26 July 1932, HHPL. BA-3 B-14

Hines to Joslin, 26 July 1932 [with two enclosures], HHPL. BA-3 C-1

Heath to Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 26 July 1932, HHPL. BA-3 C-2

W. L. Kline (chief medical officer) to medical director, Veterans Administration, 26 July 1932, HHPL. BA-3 C-4

Memorandum by J. Auffenberg, 26 July 1932, HHPL. BA-3 C-5

Unsigned memorandum, 26 July 1932 [with two enclosures], HHPL. BA-3 C-6

CHAPTER III

Riot and Rout, 27-29 July 1932

"The President's Day at the Executive Offices," U.S. Daily, 27 July 1932, Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA (hereafter cited as HHPL). BA-4 A-4

President's telephone memorandum, 27 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 A-5

Memorandum for chief clerk, 27 July 1932, Office of Administration of Veterans' Affairs, HHPL. BA-4 A-6

Frank T. Hines (administrator) to Theodore G. Joslin (secretary to president), 27 July 1932 [with enclosure dated 26 July 1932], HHPL. BA-4 A-7

Memorandum, Assistant Attorney General Nugent Dodds to Attorney General William D. Mitchell, 27 July 1932 [with ten enclosures], HHPL. BA-4 A-10

Daniel E. Garges (secretary, Board of Commissioners) to Pelham D. Glassford (major and superintendent of police), 27 July 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL. BA-4 B-2

Unsigned report, 27 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 B-4

Report by Glassford, 27 July 1932, Papers of Pelham D. Glassford, University of California at Los Angeles (hereafter cited as Glassford Papers). BA-4 B-5

"The President's Day at the Executive Offices," U.S. Daily, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 B-8

President's telephone memorandum, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 B-9

Memorandum, Mitchell to David D. Caldwell, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 B-11

Memorandum, Caldwell to Mitchell, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 B-12

Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Ferry K. Heath to Mitchell, 28 July 1932 [with two enclosures], HHPL. BA-4 B-13

Luther H. Reichelderfer (president, Board of Commissioners) to President Herbert C. Hoover, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 C-2

Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley to General Douglas MacArthur (chief of staff), 28 July 1932, Papers of Patrick J. Hurley, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK (hereafter cited as Hurley Papers). BA-4 C-3

Hurley to MacArthur, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 C-4

Hurley to Hoover, 28 July 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL. BA-4 C-5

E. N. Chisolm, Jr. (acting director, Public Buildings and Public Parks) to Mitchell, 28 July 1932 [with enclosure dated 28 July 1932, Chisolm to Edgar C. Snyder, U.S. marshal], HHPL. BA-4 C-8

Herbert Hoover, "Statement About the Bonus Marchers," 28 July 1932, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Herbert Hoover, 1932-1933 (Washington [n.d.]), pp. 339-40 (hereafter cited as Public Papers). BA-4 C-11

Two memoranda, Major General Blanton Winship to MacArthur, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 C-12

Memorandum by F. M. White (Crime Prevention Bureau), 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 D-6

Memorandum by White, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 D-7

Press interview with Hurley and MacArthur, 28 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 D-8

President's telephone memorandum, 29 July 1932, HHPL. BA-4 D-12

Report by John O. Patton (Crime Prevention Division), 29 July 1932, Glassford Papers. BA-4 D-13

Hoover to Reichelderfer, 29 July 1932 [three drafts], HHPL. BA-4 E-2

Memorandum by Patton, 29 July 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL. BA-4 E-5

Reichelderfer to Hoover, 29 July 1932 [with enclosure dated 23 July 1932], HHPL. BA-4 E-9

Glassford to commissioners, 29 July 1932, Glassford Papers. [Marked "Not Sent"]. BA-4 E-12

Hines to Lawrence Richey (secretary to president), 29 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-4 E-14
James L. Fieser (vice-chairman, American Red Cross) to Hoover, 29 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-4 F-1
Maurice S. Sheehy (assistant to the rector, Catholic University of America) to Hurley, 29 July 1932, Hurley Papers.	BA-4 F-2
Fieser to Hoover, 29 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-4 F-4
Memorandum by S. M. Scott (private, Metropolitan Police), 29 July 1932, HHPL.	BA-4 F-6
"The President's News Conference," 29 July 1932 [with an additional statement and note], Public Papers, pp. 347-50.	BA-4 F-8

CHAPTER IV

The Defense

Memorandum by L. R. [Lawrence Richey, secretary to the president], 30 July 1932, Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA (hereafter cited as HHPL). BA-5 A-4

Memorandum by O. S. Hunt (Crime Prevention Bureau), 30 July 1932, HHPL. BA-5 A-5

Adolph J. Sabath to President Herbert C. Hoover, 30 July 1932, HHPL. BA-5 A-6

President's telephone memorandum, 30 July 1932, HHPL. BA-5 A-8

President's engagement calendar, 30 July 1932, HHPL. BA-5 A-9

President's telephone memorandum, 31 July 1932, HHPL. BA-5 A-10

Report by administrator of Veterans Affairs concerning transportation of veterans temporarily living in the capital [n.d.], HHPL. BA-5 A-11

Conditions of the Bonus March, 1 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 B-7

Memorandum, Aaron W. Jacobson (special agent) to director of FBI, 1 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 C-2

Attorney General William D. Mitchell to Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 1 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 C-4

Testimony of Pelham D. Glassford before Grand Jury, 1 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 C-5

Bonus Army handbill [n.d.], HHPL. BA-5 D-11

Mitchell to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Ferry K. Heath, 1 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 D-12

L. H. Reichelderfer (president, Board of Commissioners) to Mitchell, 2 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 D-13

Richey to Mitchell, 2 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 E-1

Frank T. Hines (administrator, Veterans Administration) to Hoover, 2 August 1932 [with enclosure and covering letter from Richey], HHPL. BA-5 E-2

General Douglas MacArthur (chief of staff) to Mitchell, 2 August 1932, Papers of Patrick J. Hurley, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK (hereafter cited as Hurley Papers). BA-5 E-5

Brigadier General P. L. Miles, General Orders No. 4, 3 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 E-6

Press statement by Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley, 3 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 E-8

Anti-Hoover cartoon [n.d.], HHPL. BA-5 E-11

Memorandum, Miles to MacArthur, 4 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 E-12

Report on editorial comment on Bonus Riots, 5 August 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-5 F-11

Mitchell to MacArthur, 5 August 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-5 G-1

MacArthur to Mitchell, 6 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 G-2

Hines to regional managers of Veterans Administration Offices, 8 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 G-3

Memorandum, John O. Patton (private, Crime Prevention Bureau) to J. A. Sullivan (captain, Crime Prevention Bureau), 8 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 G-5

Memorandum by S. M. Scott (Metropolitan Police Department, Crime Prevention Division), 9 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 G-7

Robert J. Cottrell (executive secretary, Washington Board of Trade) to Hoover, 12 August 1932, HHPL. BA-5 G-9

Richey to Mitchell, 13 August 1932 [with arrest records of Bonus Army members], HHPL. BA-5 G-12

MacArthur to Hurley, 15 August 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-6 A-8

Memorandum by C. E. Cannon (precinct detective, Crime Prevention Bureau), 16 August 1932, HHPL. BA-6 B-10

Memorandum by A. Friedberg and Scott, 18 August 1932, HHPL. BA-6 B-11

Harry K. Daugherty (solicitor of the Treasury, Department of Justice) to Richey, 18 August 1932, HHPL. BA-6 B-12

Richey to Daugherty, 19 August 1932, HHPL. BA-6 C-1

Assistant Attorney General Nugent Dodds to Richey, 19 August 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL. BA-6 C-2

Representative Donald F. Snow (4th district, Maine) to Hurley, 20 August 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-6 C-6

Arthur M. Hyde to Richey, 26 August 1932, HHPL. BA-6 C-7

Hurley to Snow, 26 August 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-6 C-8

Richey to Hines, 29 August 1932, HHPL. BA-6 C-9

Undersecretary of the Treasury A. A. Ballantine to Hoover, 30 August 1932 [with two enclosures], HHPL. BA-6 C-10

Memorandum by Scott, 31 August 1932, HHPL. BA-6 D-3

Draft statement, Hurley to MacArthur [n.d.], Hurley Papers. BA-6 D-4

"Editorial Comments," Foreign Service (September 1932): 4. BA-6 D-9

"Military Rout of the B.E.F. 'Morally Indefensible,'" Foreign Service (October 1932): 9. BA-6 D-10

Memorandum, Dodds to J. Edgar Hoover (director, Bureau of Investigation), 1 September 1932, HHPL. BA-6 D-11

Hines to Walter H. Newton (secretary to president), 1 September 1932 [with enclosure dated 29 August 1932], HHPL. BA-6 D-12

Hines to Morris A. Bealle (editor/publisher, Plain Talk), 1 September 1932, HHPL. BA-6 D-14

Deposition of Philip Accetturo, 2 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-6 E-1
[J. E. Hoover] to Richey, 2 September 1932 [with enclosure dated 29 August 1932], HHPL.	BA-6 E-2
Dodds to Hurley, 2 September 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL.	BA-6 E-4
Memorandum, J. E. Hoover to Dodds, 3 September 1932 [with two enclosures], HHPL.	BA-6 E-14
Deposition of Peter Kreis, 6 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-6 F-3
Deposition of George L. Brown, 6 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-6 F-4
[Department of Justice], criminal and other records of several BEF members [6 September 1932], HHPL.	BA-6 F-5
Lewis I. H. Edwards (assistant superintendent, Metropolitan Police Department) to Major General Herbert B. Crosby (district commissioner), 8 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-6 G-4
Glassford to Crosby, 8 September 1932 [with two enclosures], HHPL.	BA-6 G-6
Deposition of William Edward Manning, 8 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-6 G-12
Memorandum, Dodds to Mitchell, 9 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-6 G-13
Supplemental memorandum of testimony presented to Grand Jury in reference to BEF, 9 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-6 G-14
Mitchell to Hoover, 9 September 1932 [with covering note to "Dear Larry" (Lawrence Richey) from Mitchell], HHPL.	BA-7 B-3
Memorandum, Dodds to Mitchell, 9 September 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL.	BA-7 C-10
Richey to J. E. Hoover, 9 September 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL.	BA-7 C-12
Memorandum, J. E. Hoover to Dodds, 10 September 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL.	BA-7 C-14
Memorandum, J. E. Hoover to Dodds, 12 September 1932 [with enclosure], HHPL.	BA-7 D-2

Press release by Acting Attorney General Thomas D. Thatcher, 13 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-7 D-4
Statement by Harry B. Bachrach [n.d.], HHPL.	BA-7 D-7
Edward F. Colladay (attorney) to Richey, 20 September 1932 [with enclosed statement by Major James A. Purcell], HHPL.	BA-7 E-2
Memorandum, Miles to MacArthur, 23 September 1932, HHPL.	BA-7 E-5
Memorandum, solicitor general to Mitchell, 2 November 1932, HHPL.	BA-7 E-7
Deposition of Lewis I. H. Edwards, 3 November 1932 [with enclosed statement], HHPL.	BA-7 E-9
Deposition of Ernest W. Brown, 3 November 1932, HHPL.	BA-7 E-13
Deposition of William H. McGrath, 4 November 1932 [with enclosed telegram, Theodore G. Joslin to Richey], HHPL.	BA-7 E-14
Merle Eugene Curti (history professor, Smith College) to President Hoover, 16 November 1932, HHPL.	BA-7 F-3

CHAPTER V

The Episode at Johnstown

J. Prentice Murphy, Report on Bonus Expeditionary Force Emergency Camp, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 10 August 1932, Pelham D. Glassford Papers, University of California at Los Angeles. BA-8 A-4

CHAPTER VI

Mounting the Political Defense: The Hoover Administration and the American Legion

Pelham D. Glassford (major and superintendent, Metropolitan Police Department), report on buildings in area around Pennsylvania Avenue, 31 July 1932, Papers of Pelham D. Glassford, University of California at Los Angeles (hereafter cited as Glassford Papers). BA-9 A-4

"Bonus Seekers at Capital Held 94% Veterans," New York Herald-Tribune, 5 August 1932, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA (hereafter cited as HHPL). BA-9 A-5

Statement by J. W. Wilford (commander, 6th Regiment, Bonus Expeditionary Forces), 9 August 1932, Glassford Papers. BA-9 A-6

Glassford to Christopher C. Cole, 10 August 1932, Glassford Papers. BA-9 A-8

Telephone message, Mark L. Requa to Lawrence Richey (secretary to president), 12 August 1932, HHPL. BA-9 A-9

Telegram, Richey to Requa, 13 August 1932, HHPL. BA-9 A-10

James N. MacLean (president, Association of Civic Service Club Executives) to President Herbert C. Hoover, 22 August 1932, HHPL. BA-9 A-11

MacLean to Frank T. Hines (administrator, Veterans Administration), 23 August 1932, HHPL. BA-9 A-12

Hines to Richey, 24 August 1932, HHPL. BA-9 A-13

Hines to MacLean, 24 August 1932, HHPL. BA-9 A-14

Hines to M. B. Head (representative, Eastern Area Veterans Administration), 24 August 1932, HHPL. BA-9 B-1

John Richardson (Massachusetts member, Republican National Committee) to Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley, 31 August 1932, Papers of Patrick J. Hurley, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK (hereafter cited as Hurley Papers). BA-9 B-2

Hurley to Richardson, 1 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 B-3

Hoover to Hurley, 6 September 1932 [with enclosure], Hurley Papers. BA-9 B-4

[Hurley] to Hoover, 7 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 B-6

Attorney General William D. Mitchell to Hoover, 9 September 1932, HHPL. BA-9 B-7

Press statement by Glassford, 12 September 1932, Glassford Papers. BA-9 C-13

Note of remarks by Jennings C. Wise, given at banquet, Baltimore, MD, 13 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 D-6

Wise to Hurley, 14 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 D-7

Telegram, United Press to Hurley [n.d.], Hurley Papers. BA-9 D-10

Hurley to United Press, 15 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 D-11

Carl T. Hatch to Wise, 15 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 D-12

Duncan I. Hassell, Jr., "A Raid on the Disabled," Foreign Service (September 1932): 18. BA-9 D-13

J. Patsy O'Neil (brigadier general, U.S. Army) to John W. Martyn (secretary of War Department), 15 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 D-14

Clerk of the secretary of war to Wise, 16 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-1

Irwin Ira Rackoff (commander, Murray Hill Post No. 56) to Hurley, 17 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-2

Hurley to Rackoff, 20 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-3

Hurley to Evan L. Davis (First National Company, Tulsa), 20 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-4

Hurley to Leland E. Smith, 20 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-5

Horace Thompson (executive assistant to secretary of war) to Ira B. Armfield (secretary, Democratic Executive Committee), 22 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-6

[Hurley] to O'Neil, 26 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-7

[Hurley] to Joseph Scott, 27 September 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-8

[Hurley] to H. H. Aylesworth (president, National Broadcasting Company), 15 November 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-9

John A. Elden to Hurley, 23 December 1932, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-10

[Hurley] to Elden, 15 January 1933, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-11

Elden to Hurley, 18 January 1933, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-12

Elden to Hurley, 31 January 1933, Hurley Papers. BA-9 E-13

Glassford to William Randolph Hearst, 21 June 1933, Glassford Papers. BA-9 E-14

Joseph H. Edgar to Hurley, 25 October 1933, Hurley Papers. BA-9 F-1

[Hurley] to Edgar, 7 November 1933, Hurley Papers. BA-9 F-2

CHAPTER VII

Roosevelt Battles the Bonus

Campaign address on federal budget, given by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 19 October 1932, in Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New York, 1938), 1:795-812 (hereafter cited as Public Papers). BA-10 A-4

Franklin D. Roosevelt to "Dear Sir," 29 October 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY (hereafter cited as FDR Library). BA-10 B-7

"A Request to the Congress for Authority to Effect Drastic Economies in Government," 10 March 1933, Public Papers, 2:49-54. BA-10 B-8

U.S., Veterans Administration, "Public No. 2, 73d Congress; and Executive Orders Issued Pursuant Thereto Governing the Granting of Benefits to Veterans of the Armed Forces of the United States and Their Dependents" (Washington, 1933), pp. 1-22. BA-10 B-13

"A Message to Veterans to Share the Spirit of Sacrifice," 1 April 1933, Public Papers, 2:99-100. BA-10 D-8

Memorandum, Colonel Duncan K. Major, Jr. (acting assistant chief of staff, War Department) to Robert Fechner (director, Emergency Conservation Department), 5 April 1933, Papers of Louis McHenry Howe, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY (hereafter cited as Howe Papers). BA-10 D-10

Executive Order, "Relief of Unemployment Through the Performance of Useful Public Work," April 1933, Howe Papers. BA-10 D-11

Louis McHenry Howe (secretary to president) to "Mr. Kelly" [H. C. McCowen], 25 April 1933, FDR Library. BA-10 D-13

Anonymous daily account of 1933 Bonus March activities. Official daily report written to Frank T. Hines (administrator, Veterans Administration), 6 May 1933 (hereafter cited as daily report to administrator, followed by appropriate date). BA-10 D-14

Daily report to administrator, 7 May 1933. BA-10 E-1

Daily report to administrator, 8 May 1933. BA-10 E-2

Daily report to administrator, 9 May 1933. BA-10 E-5

Roy Roberts (Kansas City Star) to Stephen Early (assistant secretary to president), 9 May 1933 [with enclosure], FDR Library. BA-10 E-7

Daily report to administrator, 10 May 1933. BA-10 E-12

U. S. Grant III to Roosevelt, 11 May 1933, FDR Library. BA-10 E-14

Daily report to administrator, 12 May 1933. BA-10 F-1

Daily report to administrator, 13 May 1933. BA-10 F-2

Daily report to administrator, 14 May 1933. BA-10 F-3

Daily report to administrator, 15 May 1933. BA-10 F-4

Daily report to administrator, 16 May 1933. BA-10 F-6

Daily report to administrator, 17 May 1933. BA-10 F-7

Hines to Early, 17 May 1933, FDR Library. BA-10 F-8

Daily report to administrator, 18 May 1933. BA-10 F-9

Daily report to administrator, 19 May 1933. BA-10 F-11

Daily report to administrator, 20 May 1933. BA-10 F-13

Daily report to administrator, 21 May 1933. BA-10 G-1

Daily report to administrator, 22 May 1933. BA-10 G-2

Memorandum, Early to Roosevelt, 23 May 1933, FDR Library. BA-10 G-3

"White House Statement on Ameliorations of Cuts in Veterans' Allowances," 6 June 1933, Public Papers, 2:219-21. BA-10 G-4

"The President Vetoes the Appropriation Bill as Violating the Administration's Policies of Economy," 27 March 1934, Public Papers, 3:173-81. BA-10 G-7

"The President Vetoes the Bonus Bill," 22 May 1935, Public Papers, 4:182-93. BA-11 A-3

"The President Vetoes for a Second Time the Soldiers' Bonus: A Message Written in Longhand," 24 January 1936, Public Papers, 5:67. BA-11 A-13

"White House Statement on Expediting the Payment of the Soldiers' Bonus," 27 January 1936, Public Papers, 5:68-69. BA-11 A-14

"White House Statement on the Advisability of Preserving Soldiers' Bonus Bonds," 27 January 1936, Public Papers, 5:69-70. BA-11 B-1

Chapter VIII

The Bonus Army's March into History

Independent-Herald (Hinton, WV), 26 January 1944; Edgar Rickard to Paul D. Price (editor, Independent-Herald), 7 March 1944; Price to Rickard, 9 March 1944; and Rickard to Price, 17 March 1944, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA (hereafter cited as HHPL). BA-12 A-4

Rickard to editor of Oregon Journal (Portland), 27 March 1944, HHPL. BA-12 A-8

General Douglas MacArthur to President Herbert C. Hoover, 19 May 1944, Papers of General Douglas MacArthur, MacArthur Memorial Library and Archives, Norfolk, VA (hereafter cited as MacArthur Papers). BA-12 A-9

Rickard to editor of Indianapolis Times, 23 May 1944 [with attached clipping dated 11 May 1944], HHPL. BA-12 A-10

[Pelham D. Glassford] to John T. Rogers (SVC, historian, Third Service Command), 19 January 1946, Papers of Pelham D. Glassford, University of California at Los Angeles (hereafter cited as Glassford Papers). BA-12 A-12

Glassford to Joseph Choate, 16 May 1948 [with essay entitled "MacArthur and the Bonus Army," 14 May 1948], Glassford Papers. BA-12 A-14

Floyd E. McCaffree (director, Research Division, Republican National Committee) to Patrick J. Hurley, 28 September 1948 [with enclosure dated 18 September 1948], Papers of Patrick J. Hurley, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK (hereafter cited as Hurley Papers). BA-12 B-11

Hoover to Hurley, 8 July 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 C-5

[Hurley] to editor of McCall's magazine, 8 July 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 C-6

[Hoover] to editor of McCall's magazine, 11 July 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 C-8

Hurley to Hoover, 14 July 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 C-9

George E. Sokolsky, "These Days," Washington Times-Herald, 18 July 1949. BA-12 C-10

Hoover to Hurley, 20 July 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 C-11

Hurley to Otis Lee Wiese (editor in chief, McCall's magazine), 5 August 1949, MacArthur Papers. BA-12 C-12

Hurley to MacArthur, 19 August 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 D-4

MacArthur to Hurley, 27 August 1949 [with enclosures dated 24 August 1949, Sterling Noel of New York Journal-American to MacArthur; and 25 August 1949, MacArthur to Noel], Hurley Papers. BA-12 D-5

New York Journal-American, 28, 29, 30 August 1949, HHPL. BA-12 D-8

Bob Considine, "Hoover and MacArthur Carry Reds' Smear for 17 Years," Washington Times-Herald, 1 September 1949. BA-12 D-12

H. Alexander Smith to Lawrence Richey, 1 September 1949, HHPL. BA-12 D-13

Hurley to Wiese, 9 September 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 D-14

McCaffree to Richey, 16 September 1949, HHPL. BA-12 E-1

Hazel Lyman Nichels to Bernice Miller, 27 October 1949 [with enclosure dated 17 March 1948, San Francisco News], HHPL. BA-12 E-2

"Eleanor Set Right," Washington Times-Herald, 1 November 1949. BA-12 E-4

George Van Horn Mosely to Hurley, 2 November 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 E-5

Hurley to Mosely, 7 November 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 E-7

Winifred L. Earl (secretary to Hurley) to Dorothy Marks Conte, 10 November 1949, Hurley Papers. BA-12 E-8

Hurley to L. A. Hawkins, 20 July 1950, Hurley Papers. BA-12 E-9

"M'Arthur Ouster Victory for Reds," New York Journal-American, 12 April 1951. BA-12 E-10

"General Glassford Tells of MacArthur Action Against Bonus Army in 1931," The Post (Laguna Beach, CA), 26 April 1951. BA-12 E-11

"Bonus March Story Buried by Democrats," Chicago Tribune, 1 June 1951. BA-12 E-12

Frederick Woltman, "Bonus March Probe Still Bottled Up," Washington News, 5 June 1951. BA-12 E-13

Westbrook Pegler, "Setting the Record Straight on MacArthur Incident," New York Journal-American, 5 June 1951. BA-12 E-14

Pegler, "The Great Lie Against Hoover and MacArthur," New York Journal-American, 6 June 1951. BA-12 F-1

"Bonus March in '32 Laid in '49 to Reds," New York Herald-Tribune, 14 July 1951. BA-12 F-2

"Secret Testimony of Commie on Bonus March Made Public," New York Herald-Tribune, 14 July 1951. BA-12 F-3

J. Edgar Hoover (director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) to Herbert Hoover, 16 July 1951, HHPL. BA-12 F-4

Herbert Hoover to J. Edgar Hoover, 27 July 1951, HHPL. BA-12 F-5

Major General H. W. Blakeley, "When the Army Was Smeared," Combat Forces Journal (February 1952), pp. 26-30. BA-12 F-6

Edward T. Folliard, "When Reds Invaded Washington," Washington Post-Herald, 2 December 1956. BA-12 F-8

Interview with George C. Drescher, Oral History Program, HHPL. BA-12 F-10

Bernard Bailyn et al., The Great Republic: A History of the American People (Lexington, MA, 1977), 2:1076-77. [Emphasis added]. BA-12 F-12

John M. Blum et al., The National Experience, 3d ed. (New York, 1973), 2:624-25. [Emphasis added]. BA-12 F-13

Peter N. Carroll and David W. Noble, The Restless Centuries: A History of the American People, 2d ed. (Minneapolis, 1970), pp. 430-31. [Emphasis added]. BA-12 G-1

Richard N. Current et al., American History: A Survey, 5th ed. (New York, 1979), p. 646. [Emphasis added]. BA-12 G-3

Charles M. Dollar, ed., America: Changing Times (New York, 1979), p. 851. [Emphasis added]. BA-12 G-4

John A. Garraty, The American Nation: A History of the United States Since 1865, 4th ed. (New York, 1979), 2:652. [Emphasis added]. BA-12 G-5

H. L. Ingle and James A. Ward, American History: A Brief View, 2 vols. (Boston and Toronto, 1978), 2:390. [Emphasis added]. BA-12 G-6